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LEGISLATION
SECTION 701(a) OF THE LAB1OR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959
Title VII I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 19592 sets forth several amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act.3 It is
the purpose of this comment to analyze section 701 (a) 4 of that title, which,
designed primarily to eliminate labor law's notorious no-man's land,
manifests also a new congressional policy toward the exercise of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board.
The Statute and Its History
Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act had "empowered" the NLRB
"to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8) affecting commerce." 5 This section was interpreted as giving
the Board discretionary 6 jurisdiction over labor disputes involving unfair
labor practices where the amount of interstate commerce affected was more
1

The act contains seven titles the bulk of whose provisions, by the imposition of

new duties upon both unions and employers, attempts to eliminate certain corrupt
practices in the field of labor-management relations. The first six titles concern:
title I, bill of rights for union members; II, reports of unions, officers and employees
of unions, and employers; III, union trusteeships; IV, elections; V, safeguards for
unions; VI, miscellaneous provisions.
273 Stat. 519 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 2953 (Sept. 14, 1959)). The Senate

passed the bill by a vote of 95 to 2. 105 CONG. REc. 16435 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
The House vote was 352 to 52. 105 CONG. REc. 16653 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1959). The
bill was one of a series introduced to carry out the legislative recommendations of
the McClellan Committee. In the second session of the 85th Congress, S.3974 (the
Kennedy-Ives Bill) was approved by the Senate, but the House failed to pass it.
In the first session of the 86th Congress, after amendment by the Senate Labor
Committee, the Kennedy-Ervin Bill, S. 505, was reintroduced as S. 1555. This bill
passed the Senate April 25, 1959. The House Labor Committee, however, reported
H.R. 8342, which differed from the Kennedy Bill. (It seems that this bill was
reported so that the House would have an opportunity to pass some sort of labor
legislation. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 94 (1959).) On July 27,
1959, H.R. 8400 and H.R. 8401, identical bills, were introduced on the floor of the
House by Representatives Landrum and Griffin. This substitute bill was approved
by the House August 14, 1959. It was passed as S. 1555 in order to permit a conference committee to attempt to resolve the differences. The conferees agreed on
September 2,1959; the compromise bill is the one enacted into law. CCH LAB. L. REP'.
Weekly Summary No. 579 (Sept. 3, 1959).
3
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1958).
4 73 Stat. 541 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 2983-84 (Sept. 14, 1959)), adding
subsections (c) (1) and (2) to § 14 of the National Labor Relations Act. For purposes of this comment these subsections will be referred to as §§ 701 (a) (1) and (2)
respectively.
561 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
6NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951);
NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18 (1943) ; Haleston Drug Stores,
Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
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than that to which the de minimis maxim would be applied.7 In particular
cases where on an ad hoc basis it determined that a dispute did not substantially affect commerce,8 or that the policies of the act would not be
effectuated by assertion of jurisdiction, 9 the Board refused to hear the case.
In recent years, blanket standards framed primarily in terms of dollar
volume of interstate business of the employer involved 1°--"yardsticks"
established arbitrarily as general rules of proceeding, first enunciated in
individual adjudicative proceedings before the Board, then published by
press release "--have acted as guides to Board jurisdictional decisions.12
While these standards were determinative as to the assertion of jurisdiction
in the majority of cases, 13 the Board could and did revise the standards
periodically, 14 and regarded itself as free to refuse to follow them altogether
in specific cases.15 In cases where the Board declined to exercise its
jurisdiction under the act or where if a charge were filed it would probably
so decline, complainants naturally sought relief elsewhere-from state labor
agencies and courts. The validity of such recourse was tested by the
Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah,16 Fairlawn,17 and the first Garmon 18 case.
7 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, supra note 6, at 684; NLRB
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
8
E.g., Walter J. Mentzer, 82 N.L.R.B. 389 (1949).
9 E.g., Hom-Ond Food Stores, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 647 (1948).
10The present monetary standards were announced in NLRB News Release
R-576, 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (Oct. 2, 1958). For the text of these standards see note 83
infra.
11 See 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 8 (1958).
'2 The Supreme Court has never passed on the validity of any set of Board
jurisdictional standards. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
13 "The Board has determined that it will, as it did in 1954, apply the revised
jurisdictional standards to all future and pending cases." Siemons Mailing Service,
43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1958) : "[T]he Board's decision to continue to utilize jurisdictional
standards in determining whether or not it should exercise jurisdiction in a given case
was based upon the Board's experience in making such determinations both with and
without the aid of standards. That experience has demonstrated that the utilization
of jurisdictional standards significantly reduces the amount of tine, energy, and funds
expended by the Board and its staff in the investigation and resolution of jurisdictional issues, thus enabling the Board to devote a greater portion of its resources to
the processing of substantive problems in a greater number of cases than is possible
on a case-by-case approach to the problem." 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1958).
14 The first yardsticks were established in 1950. See 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 15-39
(1951).
Revised standards were announced in 1954, see 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 2-5
(1954), and 1958. See 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 8-9 (1958).
15 "Surely this Board did not intend by announcing these standards, and should
not now, completely divest itself of power to decline to take jurisdiction upon the
basis of other factors, in that rare situation where we are convinced that the Board
would otherwise have to sacrifice the evident purposes of Congress in the interest of
mere blueprint consistency." Hotel Ass'n of St. Louis, 92 N.L.R.B. 1388, 1389 (1951).
"It would not appear subversive if the Board had decided that the activities in extraordinary cases were such that there was a substantial effect upon commerce . . .
notwithstanding the traffic fell far below the standards in monetary value." NLRB
v. W. B. Jones Lumber Co., 245 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1957) (alternative holding).
16 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
17 Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,
353 U.S. 20 (1957).
18 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).

1960]

LEGISLATION

Reading the proviso in section 10(a) 'L of the Taft-Hartley Act allowing
formal cession of cases by the Board to state agencies (if the substantive
and procedural requirements of the proviso were met) 20 as the exclusive
means whereby a state could obtain competence over activity otherwise
within the NLRB's jurisdiction, 21 the Court held that in the absence of a
cession agreement, Board declination, actual or potential, did not create
state power to enjoin conduct which the states were otherwise precluded
from enjoining. The states were "otherwise precluded" by operation of
the federal pre-emption doctrine, 22 most clearly articulated in the second
Garmon decision: 23 "When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under
§ 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction
must yield." 24 Although a few exceptions to this formula were recognized
---cases involving violence, threats of violence, mass picketing 25-a wide
class of cases was thus put out of the reach of either federal or state control.
The Supreme Court commented on the no-man's land in Guss and invited
remedial action. 28 The NLRB responded 2 7 by lowering its jurisdictional
monetary standards substantially. 28 Congress' own solution is section
701 (a) : 29
"(1) The Board, in its discretion may, by rule of decision or by
published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving
19 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
20 Cession was to be "by agreement." State law applicable to determination of
the cases had to be not "inconsistent with the corresponding [federal] provision."
The restrictive nature of the proviso has prevented the concluding of any such cession
agreements. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 15 (1957) (dissent).
21 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., supra note 20, at 9.
22 On the subject of federal pre-emption in labor relations, see generally, Cox,
Law and the Future: Labor-Management Relations, 51 Nw. U.L. Rav. 240 (1956);
Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. Rxv. 1297 (1954);
Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 959
(1954); Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAB.
REL. RFv. 391 (1958) ; Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal Versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.AJ. 415 (1956) ; Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State
Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: I, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 6 (1959); Petro, Labor

Relations Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 286 (1956).
23 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
24 Id.at 244.
25 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) ; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S.
131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
26 "Congress is free to change the situation at will . . . . The National Labor
Relations Board can greatly reduce the area of a no-ian's land by reasserting its
jurisdiction. . . ." 353 U.S. at 11.
27 NLRB Release R-576, 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (Oct. 2, 1958).
28 "Chairman Leedom estimated that the revised standards, as proposed in July,
would result in the Board's asserting jurisdiction over 20 percent of the cases it has
been rejecting." 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1958).
2973 Stat. 541 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2983-84 (Sept. 14, 1959)).
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any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That
the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing
upon August 1, 1959.
"(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any
agency or the courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming
and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board
declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction."
Although the only significant pieces of legislative history concerning
°
the section are found in debates on the floor of Congress," it would seem
safe to say that Congress' purpose is at least partially discernible. The
provisions of the section were discussed in House debate on the LandrumGriffin Bill, 3 ' the language of which was identical with that enacted except
32
that it lacked the proviso in sub-paragraph (1), added in conference.
33
Its House sponsors envisaged 701(a) as eliminating the no-man's land.
34
Further,
They stressed that the statutory language would repudiate Guss.
the debates indicate an understanding that, while the states are empowered
to act subsequent to Board dismissal in any particular case, dismissal is
not prerequisite to state action: 35 the states are permitted to act wherever
30 Little other history appears available, since the committee reports of both the
House and the Senate deal with solutions to the "no-man's land" problem which were
ultimately rejected. The conference committee's report gives no additional insight;
in its explanation of § 701(a) it merely paraphrases the statutory language. SEN. Rx P.
No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1959); H.R. RP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
17 (1959) ; H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (conference committee report)
(105 CONG. Rac. 16551 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959)).
3' H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
32

See note 2 supra.

33 "The substitute bill would eliminate the no man's land by restoring the situation substantially to what it was before the pre-emption doctrine was carried to the
point reflected in the Guss and Fairlawn decisions. . . . This bill in subsection
701 (a) would ratify the authority of the Federal Board to decline jurisdiction over
cases where the effect on commerce is insubstantial. It would permit the Board to
do this either by rule of decision or by published rules. Subsection (b) would then
vest State boards and State courts . . . with authority to exercise jurisdiction over
such classes of cases as the Board has declined or would decline." 105 CONG. REc.
13091 (daily ed. July 27, 1959). House discussion of the subsequently enacted bill
reported out of conference committee re-emphasizes the intent to eradicate the noman's land. 105 CONG. REc. 16635, 16637 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1959).
34 See note 33 .rupra.
35 During the course of debate Representative Griffin quoted in full, and without
expressing disagreement or qualification, a letter from Administrator Wendell Barnes
of the Small Business Administration: "It is imperative that an employer . . . have
direct and immediate access to the courts of his State for the settlement of any labor
dispute. It should not be necessary, as has been suggested, for him to obtain a specific
declination from the Board before obtaining such access. . . . Section 701 of the
Griffin-Landrum bill . . . appears to have been drafted with this problem in mind."
105 CONG. REc. 13806 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1959).
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the Board would decline under its jurisdictional standards.3 6 But this
much could have been accomplished by subsection (2) alone. Subsection
(1) obviously speaks not to the states but to the Board, with intent to
limit the means by which, and the conditions under which, the NLRB may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction. The function of such limitations in
furtherance of the new authority accorded to the states is in part evident:
if state tribunals are to be permitted jurisdiction over cases which the
NLRB would decline to take, and if the channeling of cases to these local
organs is to be accomplished with a minimum of confusion and delay,
access to a body of certain and comprehensible standards is indispensable.
Congress may have believed that with the extensive experience accumulated
over the course of years of jurisdictional experimentation, extreme experimental flexibility was no longer needed by the Board,3 7 especially in view
of the cost in judicial time-including, perhaps, Supreme Court timewhich erratic or inarticulate Board policy could precipitate under 701(a)
(2). In any event, that 701(a) (1) is meant hereafter to be the only
vehicle for exercise of NLRB discretion to refuse to hear a case seems clear.
A statutory authorization under specific condition and subject to express
proviso must be regarded as exclusive. The competence of the states under
subsection (2) extends only to disputes "over which the Board declines,
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction." 38 If
the NLRB retains power to decline under any authority other than subsection (1), the no-man's land continues, pro tanto, to exist-a clear perversion of the congressional purpose. Since the "may decline" clause, then,
leaves the Board only the alternatives of accepting jurisdiction or invoking
701(a) (1),3 9 it becomes important to examine the restrictions of that
section. To the extent that control of its jurisdiction is withdrawn from
41
Board discretion, 40 judicial power lies to compel the Board to act.
36 But for a different interpretation of the section see the remarks of Senator
Morse, who was a member of the conference committee. 105 CONG. Rc. 16392-93
(daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959). His statement implies that while the act ratifies the present
Board practice of case by case declination, absent such NLRB decision the states may
not determine whether the Board's jurisdictional standards have been met in a particular case. Thus the states could not act where the NLRB merely "would decline."
37 See 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1032 (1959).
38
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 701 (a) (2), 73
Stat 542 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2953 (Sept 14, 1959) ). (Emphasis added.)
:3 Of course the Board is not proscribed by 701 (a) (1) from dismissing a charge
in a case where one of the statutory requisites to its jurisdiction is not met. That
problem is posed (although resolved in favor of NLRB jurisdiction) in NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), reversing 136 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1943),
denying enforcement of 39 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1942).
Cf. NLRB v. Highland Park
Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951), affirning 184 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1950), denying enforcement of 84 N.L.R.B. 744 (1949); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485
(1947), affirming 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), enforcing 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
40 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1009
(1958) : "Except so far as . . . agency action is by law committed to agency discretion . . . any person . . . [having standing] . . . shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof." See NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952).
41Taft-Hartley Act § 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958).
Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009 (1958), provides that the reviewing court shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."
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Prior to the enactment of 701(a) judicial review 42 of NLRB asser43
tions of, or refusals to assert, jurisdiction was extremely limited.
Examining such Board action under sections 10(e) and (f) of the TaftHartley Act,44 the courts of appeals had uniformly held that the exercise
of its jurisdiction was a matter for the discretionary judgment of the
Board; 45 and while instances of judicial intervention both to restrain 46
and to compel 4 7 that exercise may be found in instances "where the Board
acts arbitrarily or capriciously or where its action conflicts with a clear
purpose of the statute," 48 it is clear that "the general rule [was] that,
where the Board has jurisdiction, . .. whether such jurisdiction should
be exercised is for the Board, not the courts to determine." 49 Attempts to
obtain judicial control by invoking the equity powers of the district courts 5
in cases not susceptible of review at the court of appeals level under the
narrow review provisions of section 10 51 had little better success: absent
allegations of deprivation of constitutional rights by Board action,5 2 or of
42

As to the problems of judicial review of administrative actions generally see
DAVIS, AD INIux.TvE LAW §§ 182-229, 234-57 (1951) ; FORKOSCH, ADmINiSTRATIVE
LAW §§ 295-347 (1956); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional

Fact, 70 HAav. L. REV. 953 (1957); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Pact, 69
Hagv. L. REV. 1020 (1956) ; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L.
REv. 239 (1955); Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Adininistrative Process, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 1 (1959); B. Schwartz, Gray v. Powell
and the Scope of Review, 54 MicH. L. Rs-v. 1 (1955). As to review of NLRB proceedings in particular see, e.g., Forkosch, Judicial Review of NLRB "Final" Unfair
Practice Orders, 4 LAB. L.J. 787 (1953); Note, The Discretionary Jurisdiction of
the NLRB, 71 HAv.L. REv. 527 (1958).
43 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
4461 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§160(e), (f) (1958).
45 NLRB v. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 241 F2d 147, 153 (9th Cir.
1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 93 (1958); NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 919 (1954); Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d
418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951) ; Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 96,
99-100 (3d Cir. 1941) (dictum).
46 NLRB v. Guy F. Atidnson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952) (retroactive
application of extended jurisdiction).
47 Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952) (refusal to
act in building industry conflict where contractors made million dollar annual direct
and indirect purchases of materials).
48
Pederson v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417, 419 (2d Cir. 1956) (refusal to act in behalf
of employee allegedly discharged for testifying before Board).
49 NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 305, 307 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
919 (1954).
5028 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
51 Section 10(e) provides for Board access to the courts to secure enforcement
of its orders. Section 10(f), allowing the contest of Board orders by private persons
aggrieved, is limited to final orders of the Board in unfair labor practice cases. 61
Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958). Thus where the General Counsel
declines to issue a complaint, Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1948) (per
curiam), or in cases of NLRB certification of a collective bargaining agent, AFL v.
NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), it is well settled that such action is not reviewable
under 10(f). (Review of the certification may, however, be indirectly obtained by
an employer by refusing to bargain with the certified agent, thus precipitating a ULP
order reviewable under 10(e) or (f). 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(d)
(1958).)
52
Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949). See Note, 71 Hv. L. REv.
527, 530 (1958).
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action violative of express statutory language,53 the district courts have
almost invariably regarded the section 10 channel of review as exclusive. 54
One district court which could be found to examine NLRB refusal to
issue a ULP complaint 55 applied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard
used by the courts of appeals. A single line of judicial incursion into
Board autonomy which did develop involved court scrutiny not of the
agency's decision to exercise or not to exercise jurisdiction per se, but of
the propriety of the grounds of that decision. In Office Employees Intl
Union v. NLRB, 56 a ULP proceeding, the Supreme Court held unlawful
NLRB refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a labor union qua labor union
acting as an employer: "We believe that such an arbitrary blanket exclusion of union employers as a class is beyond the power of the Board." 57
This holding itself might have been explained as falling within the violationof-explicit-statutory-terms category in light of express inclusion of labor
unions within the statutory definition of "employer," 58 but that Office
Employees was not to be so limited was made clear by the subsequent
decision in Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom.5 9 There, in a representation certification case, the Court in a brief per curiam held that "dismissal
of the representation petition on the sole ground of the Board's 'long,
standing policy not to exercise jurisdiction over the hotel industry' as a class
is contrary to the principles expressed in Office Employees...
" 60 The
significance for section 701(a) (1) of these lines of cases is their clear
establishment of the principles that, (a) while absent statutory limitation
the courts will not impinge on NLRB jurisdictional discretion, (b) judicial
power lies to enforce whatever restrictions Congress puts on that discretion.
53

Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) ; Farmer v. United Elec. Workers, 211
F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954).
Cf. Inland Empire'
Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945).
54 E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1936) (affirming district court refusal to act); Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F. Supp. 225 (D.
Mass. 1947) ; Food, Tobacco, Agricultural & Allied Workers v. Smiley, 74 F. Supp.
823, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 164 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1947) (dictum); see Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
55 Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 147 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 249
F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 358 U.S. 99 (1958)
(per curiam). The district court and apparently the court of appeals treated the case
as a ULP proceeding. The Supreme Court expressly regarded it as a certification
case. See 107 U. PA. L. Rev. 1027, 1030 n.28 (1959).
56 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
57 Id. at 318.

(Emphasis added.)

5861 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1958).
59 358 U.S. 99 (1958) (per curiam), 107 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1027 (1959), 73 HAv.
L. REv. 222 (1959).
60358 U.S. at 99. (Emphasis added.)
This sentence comprehends the whole of
the operative language of the Court's per curiam opinion. Note that the Board has
recently asserted jurisdiction over a substantial portion of the hotel industry, note 83
infra, and that this jurisdiction is now made mandatory under the August 1, 1959
clause of 701(a) (1).
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The Statutory Language
Four qualifying clauses in 701(a) (1) demand examination. These
will be discussed from the perspective of the inquiry whether, and to what
extent, each offers a lever for judicial control of NLRB jurisdictional
discretion.
(1) By rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act. The traditional method of NLRB abstention from the exercise of its jurisdiction has been on a case-by-case basis,
either by Board dismissal 61 or by refusal of the General Counsel 62 to issue
a complaint in the first instance.6 In recent years, however, such abstentions have invariably been predicated upon failure to meet the Board's
"yardsticks" which, as published, served also ipso facto to deter filings with
the agency. The Board has never used APA procedures 64 for the promulgation of its yardsticks, although no doubt empowered to do so; 65 rather it
has announced them first in the context of litigation. 66 Against this background, what does the italicized phrase demand? Published rules seems
clear, both in its referent and in the procedure requisite. 67 Rule of decision is considerably less so. True, the phrase can claim a venerable gloss in
quite another context 6 and may, as there, mean ad hoc adjudication in the
particular case. But, in light of the NLRB practice of announcing yardsticks by decision, and especially in view of the need for articulate clarity
of jurisdictional boundaries if 701(a) (2) is to be effectively implemented,
rule of decision may be read to demand a categorical yardstick. 69 The
61

See, e.g., Central Valley Pipe Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 233 (1955); Arkansas Airways

Co., 110 N.L.RB. 1920 (1954).
62 Pursuant to LMRA §3(d), 61 Stat. 139, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1958).
63 Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
930 (1953); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (1st Cir. 1948) (per curiam);
NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958) (dictum);
see Forkosch, Judicial Review of NLRB "Final" Unfair Labor Practice Orders,
4 LAB. L.J. 787 (1953).
64
"Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register . . . (3) substantive rules adopted as authorized by law and statements
of general policy or interpretation formulated and adopted by the agency for the
guidance of the public .

.

.

."

60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (3)

(1958).

65 Two cases particularly use language which supports the view that the agency
could have utilized APA procedure: "the jurisdictional standards enunciated in 1954,
as in 1950, were promulgated by formal decisions of the Board in cases brought
before it for adjudication. . . . Under the circumstances, the publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act cited by the Employer were not applicable
to the announcement of this standard." Jacksonville Journal Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1136,
1137 n.2 (1956); see NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 148 (9th Cir.
1952) (dictum).
66 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
67
Section 3 (a) of the APA, note 64 supra, would apply. It is probable, however,
that the "general statements of policy" exception in APA § 4(a), 60 Stat. 239 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1003 (a) (1958), would relieve proceedings for the formulation of jurisdictional yardsticks from the requirements of that subsection.
65 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
69
This would jibe with one possible reading of "class or category"-as requiring
all jurisdictional decisions to be made in the general, not particular, context.
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significance of this alternative, and perhaps its resolution, depends upon
how the entire by-clause is read. Does by mean pursuant to (dismissal
may only be pursuant to a policy previously articulated by . . .)? Or
does it mean through the mechanism of (dismissal may be operated, in any
case, through the mechanism of . . .)? The former reading seems called
for inasmuch as published rules, also modified by by are norms, not selfoperative mechanisms. But the latter reading better suits the historic
context of rule of decision-as principles governing decision, not principles
arising from it. In any event there remains the question as to whether the
two modes, rule of decision and published rules, are intended to be delimited alternatives (only by . . .) or to constitute a permissive catchall
which exhausts all methods, and thus presents no limitation at all. The
reason for the articulation of the disjunctives, in the latter case, would be to
make clear that although subsection (1) speaks of "class or category" the
device of case-by-case adjudication remained available to the Board for
definition of its jurisdiction.
The numerous possible readings allow a number of different degrees
of judicial control. It is perhaps arguable that the purpose of the sectionin part, at least, the imposition on the NLRB of an obligation of articulateness conducive to the effective appraisal by state organs of the bounds of its
jurisdiction-militates for those constructions which would set for the
courts the task of policing the coherence of the NLRB's pronouncements
defining its jurisdiction.7" It is unlikely, however, that the courts will take
on the job, in view both of its difficulty and of its doubtful utility: indeed,
the waste of judicial time involved in attempting to have the NLRB clarify
its reasoning would probably be no less than that involved in interpreting
that reasoning for purposes of subsection (2). The Board has been relatively articulate in the past and will no doubt continue to be so. 7 1 Litigants
will not be quick to raise the issue, since a faster and surer remedy for the
complainant whose charge is dismissed will presumably be found in the
state courts. Nevertheless, possibilities of judicial control remain and may
be actualized.72
70
Attempts by the judicial arm to control the articulateness of administrative
agencies would not be without respectable-if disturbing-precedent. See SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (I), 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (II); Jacob Siegel Co.
v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting
in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 480 (1952) ; 108 U. PA. L. REV. 252 (1959),
discussing Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959).
71 It should be noted that as part of its recent revision of its Rules and Regulations, 24 Fed. Reg. 9095-117 (1959), revising 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-102.125 (Supp.
1959) (effective Nov. 13, 1959), the Board has made provision for advisory opinions
as to whether it would assert jurisdiction in a given case. 24 Fed. Reg. 9101-02,
9115-16 (1959). The device is available to parties, state courts, and state agencies,
but only if an action is currently pending at the state level. Board authority to issue
such opinions derives from § 5 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1958).
72 If the Board were to accept a number of cases in violation of its yardsticks
while refusing others by appeal to the same yardsticks, the emphasis in 701 (a) (1)
on rile might well incline a reviewing court to regard such inconsistency as arbitrary
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(2) Any class or category. In the light of Office Employees and
Hotel Employees the class or category language takes on significant
illumination. At the least, Congress seems to have intended to repudiate
whatever implication might have been found in those decisions 73 that the
Board had no power to erect blanket patterns of exclusion.7 4 The significant question under the clause is whether the congressional purpose
goes to the other extreme and prescribes that the agency can decline
jurisdiction only by classes and categories, not by ad hoc appraisal of the
effect upon commerce of any particular labor dispute. The latter reading
would accord with what has been said above as to the clarificatory function
of 701(a) (1), and with a reading of other language of the subsection
which stresses rules of decision and published rules. If the Board were to
refuse to consider a case which fell within the bounds of its articulated
standards, a court might well be persuaded to intervene in implementation
75
of this interpretation of the class or category clause.
(3) Where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial. In declining to exercise
its authority over cases within its jurisdiction, the Board has habitually
offered one of two courses of explanation. Prior to 1950, its opinions were
written in terms of an assertion of jurisdiction not effectuating the policy
of the act 76 or of a particular case being one which displayed only an
and capricious, cf. NLRB v. Mall Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1941), in spite
of the usual reluctance of the courts to police consistency of administrative decision.
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946); John Kelley v. Commissioner, 326 U.S.
521 (1946).
73 The "sole ground" language of the Hotel Employees opinion permits an alternative reading which would allow blanket exclusions from jurisdiction if such exclusions
are reasoned. See 107 U. PA. L. R1v. 1027 (1959).
74 One commentator has argued that 701 (a) (1), far from overruling Hotel Employees, codifies it. The reasoning is that "inasmuch as the Board is required to find
that the 'labor dispute,' rather than the 'class or category,' does not sufficiently affect
commerce, it seems that blanket exclusions remain beyond the Board's power." 73
HARv. L. RFv. 224 (1959). But the "such dispute" which the NLRB must find too
little affects commerce is "any labor dispute involving any class or category of
employers"-a hypostatic rather than particular and actual dispute. To have the Board
make a finding of the interstate impact of every particular dispute makes the "class
or category" provision meaningless, since categories could never be applied qua
categories. Under the suggested interpretation it would be extremely difficult, especially, to find a place for the "published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act" authorization.
75 Since any complainant who challenges an NLRB refusal to assert jurisdiction
on the ground that 701 (a) (1) limits the discretion of the Board must initially raise
the issue in proceedings before the agency, the Board will have first crack at interpreting the act and a question is likely to be raised on judicial review as to the scope
of the court's authority to reexamine an NLRB construction. While the Board's
statutory interpretation-which had the effect of defining the bounds of its jurisdiction
-was accorded great weight on review by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), the question of construction there was one
which was closely tied to the substantive policies which Congress had authorized
the agency to administer, and one in the solution of which administrative expertise
could meaningfully play a part. Interpretation of 701 (a) (1) would involve neither
of these considerations, and it would be unlikely that a court which was itself inclined
to view the enactment as intended to restrict NLRB discretion would defer in its
judgment
to a contrary decision by the agency.
76
Hom-Ond Food Stores, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 647 (1948).
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insubstantial effect on commerce; 77 usually both grounds were put forth.78
More recently, refusals have been based directly on the Board's yardsticks, 79 which in turn invoke both of the same two formulae.8 0 The
habitual appearance of the phrases in conjunction and the failure of the
Board to express any difference between the contents allocable to each
enforces the conclusion that the pair represent a tag-phrase used to describe a single circumstance-a tag-phrase equally convertible with the not
sufficiently substantialphrase of 701(a) (1). If this is so, then the standard
which will guide the Board's discretion remains unchanged by the enactment. It might perhaps be argued that this legislative specification of the
test requires an explicit NLRB finding of insubstantial effect in every
case, but such a construction would be untenable in light of the classexemption language and the rule-making provision. What the statute
does do is twofold. It precludes the Board from abstaining on any ground
other than one which makes reference, directly or mediately through yardsticks which make such reference, to quantum of effect on interstate
commerce 81 (a limitation of relatively little practical impact since the
Board has not utilized, and is not likely to utilize, any other justification).
Second, so long as the Board's decisions or standards make the appropriate reference, the in the opinion of the Board phrase operates to make
the finding of insubstantiality virtually unreviewable. Congress appears
to have placed the Board's resolution of that issue behind the screen of the
APA's exception to judicial reexamination: "so far as .

.

. agency ac-

tion is by law committed to agency discretion ... .1,82 This provision,
too, may represent reaction to a lurking danger sensed in Hotel Employees.
(4) The Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards pre77
78

Walter 3. Mentzer, 82 N.L.R.B. 389 (1949).

Building & Constr. Trades Council, 85 N.L.R.B. 241, 242 (1949); Local 905,
Retail Clerks Ass'n, 83 N.L.R.B. 564 (1949).
7E.g., Jonesboro Grain Drying Co-op., 110 N.L.R.B. 481 (1954).
80 "The Board has long been of the opinion that it would better effectuate the
purposes of the Act, and promote the prompt handling of major cases, not to exercise
its jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible . . . but to limit that exercise to enterprises whose operations have, or at which labor disputes would have, a pronounced
impact on the flow of interstate commerce." Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
635, 636 (1950) ; see 23 NLRB ANN. REP. 7-9 (1958) ; 15 NLRB ANN. REP 5 (1950).
81 See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REv. 239, 258-62

(1955).

82 See note 40 supra. If this interpretation is correct, such a decision as Joliet
Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952), where the court substituted
its judgment of effect on commerce for that of the Board, is no longer tenable under
Taft-Hartley as amended. Indeed the substantial-effect-on-commerce question is one
so integrally related to the substantive content of the administrative program committed to the agency, and its decision so effective an instrument in the implementation
of that program, that it is not difficult to comprehend congressional reluctance to
subject that question to too scrupulous judicial oversight The Board's developed
expertise may also be brought to bear with particular cogency on the problem. See
Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process,
28 FoRamAm L. REv. 1, 86-87 (1959).
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vailing upon August 1, 1959. By this August 1 proviso Congress has
imposed a definitive substantive restriction upon the power of the Board
to decline jurisdiction-a class of cases which, no matter by what procedures or under the justification of what rationales, the NLRB may not
refuse to hear. The content of that class is effectively defined by the
monetary jurisdictional standards released by the Board on October 2,
1958 5 3---to which the Board had made no exception, inclusive or exclusive,
prior to the August 1 cut-off date 84 -as modified by a number of case
rules of special application.8 5 But the critical question is who is to expound
that content-which organ, as between Board and courts, is to be the
8

3 The

October 2 standards are as follows: (1) Nonretail: $50,000 outflow or

inflow, direct or indirect. (Direct outflow refers to goods shipped or services furnished
by the employer outside the state. Indirect outflow includes sales within the state to
users meeting any standard except solely an indirect inflow or indirect outflow
standard. Direct inflow refers to goods or services furnished directly to the employer
from outside the state. Indirect inflow refers to the purchase of goods or services
which originated outside the employer's state but which he purchased from a seller
within the state. Direct and indirect outflow may be combined and direct and indirect
inflow may also be combined to meet the $50,000 requirement. However, outflow
and inflow may not be combined.) (2) Office buildings: gross revenue of $100,000
of which $25,000 or more is derived from organizations which meet any of the new
standards. (3) Retail concerns: $500,000 gross volume of business. (4) Instrumentalities, links, and channels of interstate commerce: $50,000 from interstate (or linkage) part of enterprise, or from services performed for employers in commerce.
(5) Public utilities: $250,000 gross volume, or meet standard 1 (nonretail). (6) Transit systems: $250,000 gross volume. (Except taxicabs, as to which the retail ($500,000
gross volume of business) test shall apply.) (7) Newspapers and communication
systems-radio, television, telegraph and telephone: $100,000 gross volume. Newspapers: $200,000 gross volume. (8) National defense: substantial impact on national
defense. (9) Business in the territories and District of Columbia: D.C., plenary;
territories, standards apply. Associations: regarded as single employer. NLRB News
Release R-576, 42 L.R.R.M. 96-97 (Oct. 2, 1958).
Compare NLRB News Release No. 449 (July 15, 1954); NLRB News Release
No. 445, 19 NLRB ANN. REP. 2-5 (July 1, 1954).
84 A check of the cases from October 2, 1958, to and including August 1, 1959,
indicates that the Board made no alteration of the published yardsticks during that
period.
85 (a) The agency has refused to assert jurisdiction over labor disputes involving
race tracks on the ground that they are essentially local in nature. The nonretail
standards do not seem to be considered. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B.
20 (1950); Case No. F-754, 43 L.R.R.M. 1238 (December 1, 1958) (administrative
ruling of the General Counsel).
(b) The Board has determined that it will assert jurisdiction over a portion of
the hotel industry, but it utilizes a standard different than, that applicable to nonretail
businesses generally. The hotel or motel enterprise must receive a minimum of
$500,000 gross revenue annually. However, permanent or residential hotels or motels
(defined by the Board as those in which 75% of the guests stay for a month or more)
are excluded from this assertion of jurisdiction. Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 124
N.L.R.B. No. 34 (44 L.R.R.M. 1345) (July 30, 1959).
(c) The NLRB will take jurisdiction in a case where the employer refuses to
provide the agency with data concerning the jurisdictional determination and where
the record indicates the presence of statutory jurisdiction-regardless of evidence or
lack of same that the yardsticks are satisfied. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 122 N.L.R.B.
No. 29 (43 L.R.R.M. 1077) (November 18, 1958).
(d) In a case where the owner-employer was engaged in the construction of an
amusement park, the Board held that it would not assert jurisdiction merely on the
basis of nonrecurring capital expenses. Magic Mountain, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. No. 146
(44 L.R.R.M. 1083) (May 25, 1959).
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interpreter of the standards? 86 If a complainant's claim of power to
compel the Board to hear his case is based, under the August 1 clause,
on the published monetary yardsticks and if no question of exception to or
interpretation of those yardsticks is raised, the allocation of authority between agency and court will present no particularly difficult problem.
Presumably the issue contended will be one of fact, and the Board's findings
will be conclusive so long as supported by substantial evidence on the whole
record.8 7 But what if the complainant asserts that he would have been
heard on August 1 under an exception to the published yardsticks? 8
What if questions of construction and application of the yardsticks ariserefinements and distinctions within the inflow-outflow concepts, 9 operation of the standards in the context of peculiar transactions, 0 categorization
of an employer for purposes of the standards? 9 1 Conceptually these applications of the standards and the standards themselves could also be
regarded as questions of fact,92 virtually immunized from judicial review.
Or conceptually they might be regarded as questions of law, incorporated
by reference into 701(a) (1). Neither conception is helpful. The issue,
In the construction of 701 (a) (1) it may perhaps be argued that the legislative
term standards does not encompass these various more particular rules-rules for the
most part in the nature of exclusions from jurisdiction-but makes reference only to
the general monetary yardsticks published by press release. But such a reading, which
would operate to expand the jurisdiction of the Board as it in fact would have been
exercised on the cut-off date, seems ill-consonant with the tenor of the enactment.
Moreover, if distinctions are to be made among the principles governing the assertion
of jurisdiction on that date, what is to be the principle of discrimination? The fact
of inclusion in the October 2 press release vel non? Or of inclusion in the Board's
annual report to Congress? Or the degree of generality of the standard? (Is the
standard for public utilities more general than that for hotels?)
86
Lowering its yardsticks in 1958, the Board indicated that any "further broadening of its jurisdiction, at this time, would produce a caseload of such proportions as
seriously" to impair the current efficacy of the Board. 23 NLRB AwN. REP. 8 (1958).
So long as this view prevails and the Board does not expand its reach, the minimum
permissible scope of Board jurisdiction, as fixed by the August 1 clause, will remain
the operative boundary of NLRB action and-whatever the theoretical powers of the
Board under 701(a) (1)-the determination of who is to police those boundaries,
agency or courts, is especially crucial.
87
Taft-Hartley Act § 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958);
APA § 10(e)(5), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)(5) (1958); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951). See Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
88 Consider the uncooperative-employer exception, note 85 (c) supra. Under the
statute, how much liberty does the Board now have to retract the scope of that exception?
89 See J. Tom Moore & Sons, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1663 (1958); Brown Marine
Drilling Co., 117 N.LR.B. 331 (1957).
90 See McFarling Bros. Midstate Poultry & Egg Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1576 (1958).
91 See Chock Full O'Nuts, 118 N.L.R.B 156 (1957).
92 By this perspective, what the Board would have done on August 1, although
a point of law on August 1 itself, has become for purposes of the act a matter of fact,
retrospectively deducted, to which 701 (a) (1) attaches the incident of law: mandatory
jurisdiction. That the state of the law as of a given moment in time can operate as
a fact for some juridical purposes should be evident. Consider Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), where with reference to a claim of unconstitutional
impairment of contract by repeal of a state statute, the nature of the contractual right
under the repealed statute became determinative.
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posed most strongly from the perspective of agency autonomy, is whether
Congress intended to withdraw from agency control a set of standards,
developed flexibly within the administrative mold and in mid-course of
articulation, and deliver them into the relatively inexperienced hands of the
courts? Posed most strongly the other way, the same issue is: did
Congress, which threw open a wide range of agency discretion delimited
by a single express proviso, intend to leave the bounds of that proviso
also to be drawn by agency discretion?
The extent of control which the courts will assert under 701(a) (1)
will no doubt depend upon their view of its function. If it is regarded as
merely clarificatory, in aid of 701 (a) (2), judicial scrutiny will probably
not be severe, under the theory that it is no particularly wise bargain to
save the state-court time required to interpret the limits of the Board's
jurisdiction at the expense of the federal-court time required to police those
limits. But the August 1 proviso cannot be read as merely clarificatory:
its operation clearly both falls short of and surpasses an illuminative function. The only tenable view of that clause is that its framers, while
strongly affirming elsewhere throughout the amendment the power of the
Board to use the selective exercise of its jurisdiction as an implement of
its administrative program,93 were unwilling to leave wholly unconfined
the opinion of the Board. For purposes of limitation the enactment has
adopted the Board's own yardsticks, the product of its matured experience
in light of its capacities for efficient operation and of the needs of that
sphere of the national economy which it administers. While the courts
will undoubtedly view with great respect such Board interpretations of
its August 1 standards as represent a consistent and logically proximate
extension of them, any Board curtailment of its jurisdiction which would
represent a shift away from the policy embodied in those standards will
be liable to judicial override.
9
3 That the courts have accorded considerable freedom to the NLRB's view of
the appropriate sphere of its activity, even when the outer limits of its jurisdiction
were in issue is evidenced by NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
But compare the approach of the Court in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947). The comparison is suggested in JAFFE, ADMINISTRATE LAW 630-31

(1954).

